In automata theory (a branch of theoretical computer science), NFA minimization is the task of transforming a given nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) into an equivalent NFA that has a minimum number of states, transitions, or both. While efficient algorithms exist for DFA minimization, NFA minimization is PSPACE-complete. No efficient (polynomial time) algorithms are known, and under the standard assumption that P ≠ PSPACE, none exist. The most efficient known algorithm is the Kameda–Weiner algorithm. == Non-uniqueness of minimal NFA == Unlike deterministic finite automata, minimal NFAs may not be unique. There may be multiple NFAs with the same number of states that accept the same regular language, but for which there is no equivalent NFA or DFA with fewer states.
Threat actor
In cybersecurity and risk assessment, a threat actor (or threat agents, attackers, or adversaries) is a person, group, organisation, state, or other entity with the ability to cause, carry, transmit, support, or exploit a threat. Threat actors are commonly analysed according to their motivations, resources, technical capability, access to systems, relationship to a target, and degree of connection to state authority. They may exploit vulnerabilities, conduct social engineering, steal or monetise data, disrupt operations, or support other actors who carry out such activity. Because the term covers a wide range of actors, researchers and security organisations use taxonomies that distinguish between groups such as cybercriminals, state-linked actors, ideologically motivated actors, thrill seekers or trolls, insiders, and competitors. Threat actor classifications are used in risk management, cyber threat intelligence, and incident response to connect observed behaviour with possible objectives and likely future activity. The categories are not always mutually exclusive: the same actor may combine criminal, ideological, commercial, or state-linked motivations, and different organisations may use different names for similar actors. == Risk assessment and security management == In risk assessment, threat actor analysis is used to identify who or what may create, carry, transmit, support, or exploit a threat, and how that actor relates to the system being assessed. Rausand and Haugen classify threat actors by their relationship to the system, distinguishing between internal and external actors, and by intent, distinguishing between intentional and unintentional actors. Threat actor classification may also support incident investigation. Rogers argued that actor categories could be inferred from observable case points, such as tools used, messages left, data targeted, forensic knowledge, and the degree of damage, allowing investigators to assess likely motivation and skill level. Later work similarly linked actor classification to operational analysis. Chng, Lu, Kumar and Yau proposed a framework connecting hacker types, motivations and typical strategies, arguing that observed behaviour before or during an attack can help analysts infer the likely type of actor involved. At the strategic level, actor analysis may consider an actor's resources, capabilities, degree of state involvement, motivations and objectives. == Landscape == The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has described the contemporary cyberthreat landscape as involving an increasingly diverse and interconnected set of actors, including state-led operations, cybercriminal syndicates, ideological hacktivists, commercial cyber mercenaries, private companies and civilian volunteers. Its 2026 report argued that these actors vary in resources, technical sophistication and relationships with states, making it traditional distinctions between state, civilian combatant roles, and legitimate and illegitimate conduct harder to apply. == Academic taxonomies == Early taxonomies classified hackers by activity, skill, motivation, or criminal profile. Landreth proposed six categories based on activity: novice, student, tourist, crasher, and thief. Hollinger classified computer misuse into pirates, browsers, and crackers, describing a progression from less-skilled activity to more technically serious offences. Chantler used attributes including activity, skill, knowledge, motivation, and duration of involvement to distinguish between an elite group, neophytes, and "losers and lamers". Parker proposed seven profiles of cybercriminals: pranksters, hacksters, malicious hackers, personal problem solvers, career criminals, extreme advocates, and malcontents, addicts, and irrational or incompetent people. In 2000, Marc Rogers proposed a taxonomy of hackers with seven, non-mutually-exclusive categories: newbie/tool kit users, cyber-punks, internals, coders, old guard hackers, professional criminals, and cyber-terrorists. Rausand and Haugen distinguish between internal and external threat actors, and between intentional and unintentional threat actors. Internal actors have some relationship with, access to, or position inside the system or organisation, while external actors operate from outside it. Intentional actors seek to create, exploit, or support a threat event, whereas unintentional actors may cause or enable a threat event through error, negligence, accident, or lack of awareness. Rogers later revised his hacker taxonomy into Novices, Cyber-punks, Internals, Petty Thieves, Virus Writers, Old Guard hackers, Professional Criminals, Information Warriors, and, more tentatively, Political Activists. In the model, motivation is grouped into four broad domains: curiosity, notoriety, revenge, and financial gain. A 2022 review by Chng, Lu, Kumar and Yau examined 11 hacker typologies published over three decades and proposed a unified framework linking hacker types, motivations, and strategies. The framework identified 13 hacker types and seven motivations, and argued that observed strategies during an attack can help analysts infer the likely type of actor involved. == Government taxonomies == Taxonomies of threat actors by governments are much more likely to include state-level threat actors. In the United States the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) uses the term threat source in its risk-assessment guidance: organisations are directed to identify and characterise threat sources of concern, including capability, intent and targeting for adversarial threat sources, and the range of effects for non-adversarial threat sources. NIST treats threat-source identification as part of the risk-assessment process, alongside identifying threat events, vulnerabilities, likelihood and impact. In the EU, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity publishes the annual ENISA Threat Landscape, which analyses cyber incidents and adversary behaviour affecting the European Union. The 2025 report analysed selected incidents from the previous year and grouped activity around cybercrime, state-aligned activity, foreign information manipulation and interference, and hacktivism. In ENISA's 2025 analysis, hacktivist activity dominated reporting, representing almost 80% of recorded incidents and consisting mainly of low-level distributed denial-of-service operations. ENISA also reported increasing convergence between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity, including state-aligned use of hacktivist personas, hacktivist adoption of ransomware, and false-flag or impersonation activity. At the UN level, A 2026 report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research described the cyberthreat landscape as involving state-led operations, cybercriminal syndicates, ideological hacktivists, commercial cyber mercenaries, and civilian volunteers, with actors varying in resources, technical sophistication, and links to states. Canada defines threat actors as states, groups, or individuals who aim to cause harm by exploiting a vulnerability with malicious intent. A threat actor must be trying to gain access to information systems to access or alter data, devices, systems, or networks. The Japanese government's National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy (NISC) was established in 2015 to create a "free, fair and secure cyberspace" in Japan. The NICS created a cybersecurity strategy in 2018 that outlines nation-states and cybercrime to be some of the most key threats. It also indicates that terrorist usage of the cyberspace needs to be monitored and understood. The Security Council of the Russian Federation published the cyber security strategy doctrine in 2016. This strategy highlights the following threat actors as a risk to cyber security measures: nation-state actors, cyber criminals, and terrorists. == Techniques == Threat actors use techniques like Social engineering (security), and Phishing, alongside technical exploits like Cross-site scripting, SQL injection, and denial-of-service attacks. == Limitations == In practice, actor categories may overlap (Edward Snowden for example), and the same activity may combine features associated with hacktivism, cybercrime and state-linked operations. The lines between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity had continued to blur, with shared toolsets, overlapping methods, fake personas, hacktivist adoption of ransomware, and cybercriminal or state-linked actors masquerading as other groups. Threat actor analysis also has limits as a risk-management method. NIST notes that risk assessments depend on their purpose, scope, assumptions, constraints, information sources, risk model and analytic approach, and that assessments are tied to particular time frames and organisational contexts. NIST also warns that simple threat-vulnerability pairing may be undesirable or problematic where there are many threats and vulnerabilities, and recom
Kernel embedding of distributions
In machine learning, the kernel embedding of distributions (also called the kernel mean or mean map) comprises a class of nonparametric methods in which a probability distribution is represented as an element of a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). A generalization of the individual data-point feature mapping done in classical kernel methods, the embedding of distributions into infinite-dimensional feature spaces can preserve all of the statistical features of arbitrary distributions, while allowing one to compare and manipulate distributions using Hilbert space operations such as inner products, distances, projections, linear transformations, and spectral analysis. This learning framework is very general and can be applied to distributions over any space Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } on which a sensible kernel function (measuring similarity between elements of Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } ) may be defined. For example, various kernels have been proposed for learning from data which are: vectors in R d {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{d}} , discrete classes/categories, strings, graphs/networks, images, time series, manifolds, dynamical systems, and other structured objects. The theory behind kernel embeddings of distributions has been primarily developed by Alex Smola, Le Song, Arthur Gretton, and Bernhard Schölkopf. A review of recent works on kernel embedding of distributions can be found in. The analysis of distributions is fundamental in machine learning and statistics, and many algorithms in these fields rely on information theoretic approaches such as entropy, mutual information, or Kullback–Leibler divergence. However, to estimate these quantities, one must first either perform density estimation, or employ sophisticated space-partitioning/bias-correction strategies which are typically infeasible for high-dimensional data. Commonly, methods for modeling complex distributions rely on parametric assumptions that may be unfounded or computationally challenging (e.g. Gaussian mixture models), while nonparametric methods like kernel density estimation (Note: the smoothing kernels in this context have a different interpretation than the kernels discussed here) or characteristic function representation (via the Fourier transform of the distribution) break down in high-dimensional settings. Methods based on the kernel embedding of distributions sidestep these problems and also possess the following advantages: Data may be modeled without restrictive assumptions about the form of the distributions and relationships between variables Intermediate density estimation is not needed Practitioners may specify the properties of a distribution most relevant for their problem (incorporating prior knowledge via choice of the kernel) If a characteristic kernel is used, then the embedding can uniquely preserve all information about a distribution, while thanks to the kernel trick, computations on the potentially infinite-dimensional RKHS can be implemented in practice as simple Gram matrix operations Dimensionality-independent rates of convergence for the empirical kernel mean (estimated using samples from the distribution) to the kernel embedding of the true underlying distribution can be proven. Learning algorithms based on this framework exhibit good generalization ability and finite sample convergence, while often being simpler and more effective than information theoretic methods Thus, learning via the kernel embedding of distributions offers a principled drop-in replacement for information theoretic approaches and is a framework which not only subsumes many popular methods in machine learning and statistics as special cases, but also can lead to entirely new learning algorithms. == Definitions == Let X {\displaystyle X} denote a random variable with domain Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } and distribution P {\displaystyle P} . Given a symmetric, positive-definite kernel k : Ω × Ω → R {\displaystyle k:\Omega \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb {R} } the Moore–Aronszajn theorem asserts the existence of a unique RKHS H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}} on Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } (a Hilbert space of functions f : Ω → R {\displaystyle f:\Omega \to \mathbb {R} } equipped with an inner product ⟨ ⋅ , ⋅ ⟩ H {\displaystyle \langle \cdot ,\cdot \rangle _{\mathcal {H}}} and a norm ‖ ⋅ ‖ H {\displaystyle \|\cdot \|_{\mathcal {H}}} ) for which k {\displaystyle k} is a reproducing kernel, i.e., in which the element k ( x , ⋅ ) {\displaystyle k(x,\cdot )} satisfies the reproducing property ⟨ f , k ( x , ⋅ ) ⟩ H = f ( x ) ∀ f ∈ H , ∀ x ∈ Ω . {\displaystyle \langle f,k(x,\cdot )\rangle _{\mathcal {H}}=f(x)\qquad \forall f\in {\mathcal {H}},\quad \forall x\in \Omega .} One may alternatively consider x ↦ k ( x , ⋅ ) {\displaystyle x\mapsto k(x,\cdot )} as an implicit feature mapping φ : Ω → H {\displaystyle \varphi :\Omega \rightarrow {\mathcal {H}}} (which is therefore also called the feature space), so that k ( x , x ′ ) = ⟨ φ ( x ) , φ ( x ′ ) ⟩ H {\displaystyle k(x,x')=\langle \varphi (x),\varphi (x')\rangle _{\mathcal {H}}} can be viewed as a measure of similarity between points x , x ′ ∈ Ω . {\displaystyle x,x'\in \Omega .} While the similarity measure is linear in the feature space, it may be highly nonlinear in the original space depending on the choice of kernel. === Kernel embedding === The kernel embedding of the distribution P {\displaystyle P} in H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}} (also called the kernel mean or mean map) is given by: μ X := E [ k ( X , ⋅ ) ] = E [ φ ( X ) ] = ∫ Ω φ ( x ) d P ( x ) {\displaystyle \mu _{X}:=\mathbb {E} [k(X,\cdot )]=\mathbb {E} [\varphi (X)]=\int _{\Omega }\varphi (x)\ \mathrm {d} P(x)} If P {\displaystyle P} allows a square integrable density p {\displaystyle p} , then μ X = E k p {\displaystyle \mu _{X}={\mathcal {E}}_{k}p} , where E k {\displaystyle {\mathcal {E}}_{k}} is the Hilbert–Schmidt integral operator. A kernel is characteristic if the mean embedding μ : { family of distributions over Ω } → H {\displaystyle \mu :\{{\text{family of distributions over }}\Omega \}\to {\mathcal {H}}} is injective. Each distribution can thus be uniquely represented in the RKHS and all statistical features of distributions are preserved by the kernel embedding if a characteristic kernel is used. === Empirical kernel embedding === Given n {\displaystyle n} training examples { x 1 , … , x n } {\displaystyle \{x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n}\}} drawn independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from P , {\displaystyle P,} the kernel embedding of P {\displaystyle P} can be empirically estimated as μ ^ X = 1 n ∑ i = 1 n φ ( x i ) {\displaystyle {\widehat {\mu }}_{X}={\frac {1}{n}}\sum _{i=1}^{n}\varphi (x_{i})} === Joint distribution embedding === If Y {\displaystyle Y} denotes another random variable (for simplicity, assume the co-domain of Y {\displaystyle Y} is also Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } with the same kernel k {\displaystyle k} which satisfies ⟨ φ ( x ) ⊗ φ ( y ) , φ ( x ′ ) ⊗ φ ( y ′ ) ⟩ = k ( x , x ′ ) k ( y , y ′ ) {\displaystyle \langle \varphi (x)\otimes \varphi (y),\varphi (x')\otimes \varphi (y')\rangle =k(x,x')k(y,y')} ), then the joint distribution P ( x , y ) ) {\displaystyle P(x,y))} can be mapped into a tensor product feature space H ⊗ H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}\otimes {\mathcal {H}}} via C X Y = E [ φ ( X ) ⊗ φ ( Y ) ] = ∫ Ω × Ω φ ( x ) ⊗ φ ( y ) d P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {C}}_{XY}=\mathbb {E} [\varphi (X)\otimes \varphi (Y)]=\int _{\Omega \times \Omega }\varphi (x)\otimes \varphi (y)\ \mathrm {d} P(x,y)} By the equivalence between a tensor and a linear map, this joint embedding may be interpreted as an uncentered cross-covariance operator C X Y : H → H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {C}}_{XY}:{\mathcal {H}}\to {\mathcal {H}}} from which the cross-covariance of functions f , g ∈ H {\displaystyle f,g\in {\mathcal {H}}} can be computed as Cov ( f ( X ) , g ( Y ) ) := E [ f ( X ) g ( Y ) ] − E [ f ( X ) ] E [ g ( Y ) ] = ⟨ f , C X Y g ⟩ H = ⟨ f ⊗ g , C X Y ⟩ H ⊗ H {\displaystyle \operatorname {Cov} (f(X),g(Y)):=\mathbb {E} [f(X)g(Y)]-\mathbb {E} [f(X)]\mathbb {E} [g(Y)]=\langle f,{\mathcal {C}}_{XY}g\rangle _{\mathcal {H}}=\langle f\otimes g,{\mathcal {C}}_{XY}\rangle _{{\mathcal {H}}\otimes {\mathcal {H}}}} Given n {\displaystyle n} pairs of training examples { ( x 1 , y 1 ) , … , ( x n , y n ) } {\displaystyle \{(x_{1},y_{1}),\dots ,(x_{n},y_{n})\}} drawn i.i.d. from P {\displaystyle P} , we can also empirically estimate the joint distribution kernel embedding via C ^ X Y = 1 n ∑ i = 1 n φ ( x i ) ⊗ φ ( y i ) {\displaystyle {\widehat {\mathcal {C}}}_{XY}={\frac {1}{n}}\sum _{i=1}^{n}\varphi (x_{i})\otimes \varphi (y_{i})} === Conditional distribution embedding === Given a conditional distribution P ( y ∣ x ) , {\displaystyle P(y\mid x),} one can define the corresponding RKHS embedding as μ Y ∣ x = E [ φ ( Y ) ∣ X ] = ∫ Ω φ ( y ) d P ( y ∣ x ) {\displaystyle \mu _{Y\mid x}=\mathbb {E} [\varphi (Y)\mid X]=\int _{\Omega
Pythia (machine learning)
Pythia is an ancient text restoration model that recovers missing characters from damaged text input using deep neural networks. It was created by Yannis Assael, Thea Sommerschield, and Jonathan Prag, researchers from Google DeepMind and the University of Oxford. To study the society and the history of ancient civilisations, ancient history relies on disciplines such as epigraphy, the study of ancient inscribed texts. Hundreds of thousands of these texts, known as inscriptions, have survived to our day, but are often damaged over the centuries. Illegible parts of the text must then be restored by specialists, called epigraphists, in order to extract meaningful information from the text and use it to expand our knowledge of the context in which the text was written. Pythia takes as input the damaged text, and is trained to return hypothesised restorations of ancient Greek inscriptions, working as an assistive aid for ancient historians. Its neural network architecture works at both the character- and word-level, thereby effectively handling long-term context information, and dealing efficiently with incomplete word representations. Pythia is applicable to any discipline dealing with ancient texts (philology, papyrology, codicology) and can work in any language (ancient or modern).
Emergent algorithm
An emergent algorithm is an algorithm that exhibits emergent behavior. In essence an emergent algorithm implements a set of simple building block behaviors that when combined exhibit more complex behaviors. One example of this is the implementation of fuzzy motion controllers used to adapt robot movement in response to environmental obstacles. An emergent algorithm has the following characteristics: it achieves predictable global effects it does not require global visibility it does not assume any kind of centralized control it is self-stabilizing Other examples of emergent algorithms and models include cellular automata, artificial neural networks and swarm intelligence systems (ant colony optimization, bees algorithm, etc.).
Flo (app)
Flo is a period-tracking app that provides menstrual cycle, ovulation and pregnancy tracking as well as perimenopause symptom tracking that was developed by Flo Health, Inc. It has over 380 million downloads worldwide and over 70 million monthly active users as of November 2024. In mid-2024, it reached unicorn status, and became Europe’s first femtech unicorn. The company has been accused of sharing users' sensitive health data with third parties without consent and misleading its users about data practices. == History == Flo Health, Inc. was co-founded in 2015 by Dmitry and Yuri Gurski, in Belarus. Their backgrounds helped build the first version of the software having experience in other fitness and health apps. Dmitry serves as the company's CEO. The company's development hubs are in London, Amsterdam and Vilnius. In 2016, the company raised $1 million in seed round funding from Flint Capital and Haxus Venture Fund. In 2017, Flo received an investment of $5 million from Flint Capital and model Natalia Vodianova with Vodianova helping develop an awareness campaign for the company. In 2018, Flo received an investment of $6 million from Mangrove Capital Partners, with participation from Flint Capital and Haxus, giving the company a valuation of $200 million. In mid-2019, Flo received an additional investment of $7.5 million led by Founders Fund. In 2020, the Federal Trade Commission alleged that Flo had misled users about its handling of health information to third parties including Google, Facebook, AppsFlyer, and Flurry since 2016. These allegations followed a 2019 report by The Wall Street Journal in reference to Facebook. The company reached a settlement in 2021 and was required to notify users of how their personal information was shared and obtain permission before any further information was shared. The agreement also required that Flo to undertake an independent privacy audit which it completed in March 2022. In early September 2021, Flo announced it closed $50M in a Series B financing, bringing the total capital raised to $65 million and company valuation to $800M led by VNV Global and Target Global. In March 2024, the Supreme Court of British Columbia certified a class action suit against Flo for sharing intimate data with Facebook and other third parties without user knowledge. In July 2024, Flo announced it raised more than $200M in Series C financing from General Atlantic bringing its valuation beyond $1 billion. As of November 2024, the app had over 380 million downloads world wide, and over 70 million monthly active users. In 2025, Flo adopted a data intelligence platform from Databricks to power its analytics and AI features, allowing users personalized cycle predictions. In 2025, a class action lawsuit in California was settled for $56 million with Flo paying $8 million and Google paying $48 million. == Features and privacy == Flo was initially created as a period and ovulation tracking application. It now provides reminders of upcoming menstrual cycles and a place to record various other health symptoms such as contraceptive methods, vaginal discharge (leukorrhea), water intake, pains, mood swings, and sexual activity. The application is available on iOS and Android. Flo is free to download and the free basic version gives you access to period and ovulation tracking and predictions, symptom tracking, cycle history, and anonymous mode. In Pregnancy mode, the app provides tracking features and educational material for pregnancy. In October 2023, Flo launched Flo for Partners, a feature that allows users to share their Flo data with their partner. In September 2022, as a response to Roe v. Wade being overturned, Flo sped up the release of a feature called "Anonymous Mode". Flo said this mode allows users to access the app without any personal identifiers such as name, email address, or technical identifiers being associated with their health data. Flo said it uses a technology called Oblivious HTTP to help protect user privacy in Anonymous Mode. == Recognition == Flo was named to Bloomberg’s Top 25 UK Startups to Watch for 2024. Flo's Anonymous Mode feature was recognized on both Fast Company's World Changing Ideas 2023 and TIME's Best Inventions List 2023. Flo is a CES 2019 Innovation Awards Honoree in the Software and Mobile Applications category.
Argumentation framework
In artificial intelligence and related fields, an argumentation framework is a way to deal with contentious information and draw conclusions from it using formalized arguments. In an abstract argumentation framework, entry-level information is a set of abstract arguments that, for instance, represent data or a proposition. Conflicts between arguments are represented by a binary relation on the set of arguments. In concrete terms, an argumentation framework is represented with a directed graph such that the nodes are the arguments, and the arrows represent the attack relation. There exist some extensions of the Dung's framework, like the logic-based argumentation frameworks or the value-based argumentation frameworks. == Abstract argumentation frameworks == === Formal framework === Abstract argumentation frameworks, also called argumentation frameworks à la Dung, are defined formally as a pair: A set of abstract elements called arguments, denoted A {\displaystyle A} A binary relation on A {\displaystyle A} , called attack relation, denoted R {\displaystyle R} For instance, the argumentation system S = ⟨ A , R ⟩ {\displaystyle S=\langle A,R\rangle } with A = { a , b , c , d } {\displaystyle A=\{a,b,c,d\}} and R = { ( a , b ) , ( b , c ) , ( d , c ) } {\displaystyle R=\{(a,b),(b,c),(d,c)\}} contains four arguments ( a , b , c {\displaystyle a,b,c} and d {\displaystyle d} ) and three attacks ( a {\displaystyle a} attacks b {\displaystyle b} , b {\displaystyle b} attacks c {\displaystyle c} and d {\displaystyle d} attacks c {\displaystyle c} ). Dung defines some notions : an argument a ∈ A {\displaystyle a\in A} is acceptable with respect to E ⊆ A {\displaystyle E\subseteq A} if and only if E {\displaystyle E} defends a {\displaystyle a} , that is ∀ b ∈ A {\displaystyle \forall b\in A} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R , ∃ c ∈ E {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R,\exists c\in E} such that ( c , b ) ∈ R {\displaystyle (c,b)\in R} , a set of arguments E {\displaystyle E} is conflict-free if there is no attack between its arguments, formally : ∀ a , b ∈ E , ( a , b ) ∉ R {\displaystyle \forall a,b\in E,(a,b)\not \in R} , a set of arguments E {\displaystyle E} is admissible if and only if it is conflict-free and all its arguments are acceptable with respect to E {\displaystyle E} . === Different semantics of acceptance === ==== Extensions ==== To decide if an argument can be accepted or not, or if several arguments can be accepted together, Dung defines several semantics of acceptance that allows, given an argumentation system, sets of arguments (called extensions) to be computed. For instance, given S = ⟨ A , R ⟩ {\displaystyle S=\langle A,R\rangle } , E {\displaystyle E} is a complete extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is an admissible set and every acceptable argument with respect to E {\displaystyle E} belongs to E {\displaystyle E} , E {\displaystyle E} is a preferred extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is a maximal element (with respect to the set-theoretical inclusion) among the admissible sets with respect to S {\displaystyle S} , E {\displaystyle E} is a stable extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is a conflict-free set that attacks every argument that does not belong in E {\displaystyle E} (formally, ∀ a ∈ A ∖ E , ∃ b ∈ E {\displaystyle \forall a\in A\backslash E,\exists b\in E} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R} , E {\displaystyle E} is the (unique) grounded extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is the smallest element (with respect to set inclusion) among the complete extensions of S {\displaystyle S} . There exists some inclusions between the sets of extensions built with these semantics : Every stable extension is preferred, Every preferred extension is complete, The grounded extension is complete, If the system is well-founded (there exists no infinite sequence a 0 , a 1 , … , a n , … {\displaystyle a_{0},a_{1},\dots ,a_{n},\dots } such that ∀ i > 0 , ( a i + 1 , a i ) ∈ R {\displaystyle \forall i>0,(a_{i+1},a_{i})\in R} ), all these semantics coincide—only one extension is grounded, stable, preferred, and complete. Some other semantics have been defined. One introduce the notation E x t σ ( S ) {\displaystyle Ext_{\sigma }(S)} to note the set of σ {\displaystyle \sigma } -extensions of the system S {\displaystyle S} . In the case of the system S {\displaystyle S} in the figure above, E x t σ ( S ) = { { a , d } } {\displaystyle Ext_{\sigma }(S)=\{\{a,d\}\}} for every Dung's semantic—the system is well-founded. That explains why the semantics coincide, and the accepted arguments are: a {\displaystyle a} and d {\displaystyle d} . ==== Labellings ==== Labellings are a more expressive way than extensions to express the acceptance of the arguments. Concretely, a labelling is a mapping that associates every argument with a label in (the argument is accepted), out (the argument is rejected), or undec (the argument is undefined—not accepted or refused). One can also note a labelling as a set of pairs ( a r g u m e n t , l a b e l ) {\displaystyle ({\mathit {argument}},{\mathit {label}})} . Such a mapping does not make sense without additional constraint. The notion of reinstatement labelling guarantees the sense of the mapping. L {\displaystyle L} is a reinstatement labelling on the system S = ⟨ A , R ⟩ {\displaystyle S=\langle A,R\rangle } if and only if : ∀ a ∈ A , L ( a ) = i n {\displaystyle \forall a\in A,L(a)={\mathit {in}}} if and only if ∀ b ∈ A {\displaystyle \forall b\in A} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R , L ( b ) = o u t {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R,L(b)={\mathit {out}}} ∀ a ∈ A , L ( a ) = o u t {\displaystyle \forall a\in A,L(a)={\mathit {out}}} if and only if ∃ b ∈ A {\displaystyle \exists b\in A} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R} and L ( b ) = i n {\displaystyle L(b)={\mathit {in}}} ∀ a ∈ A , L ( a ) = u n d e c {\displaystyle \forall a\in A,L(a)={\mathit {undec}}} if and only if L ( a ) ≠ i n {\displaystyle L(a)\neq {\mathit {in}}} and L ( a ) ≠ o u t {\displaystyle L(a)\neq {\mathit {out}}} One can convert every extension into a reinstatement labelling: the arguments of the extension are in, those attacked by an argument of the extension are out, and the others are undec. Conversely, one can build an extension from a reinstatement labelling just by keeping the arguments in. Indeed, Caminada proved that the reinstatement labellings and the complete extensions can be mapped in a bijective way. Moreover, the other Datung's semantics can be associated to some particular sets of reinstatement labellings. Reinstatement labellings distinguish arguments not accepted because they are attacked by accepted arguments from undefined arguments—that is, those that are not defended cannot defend themselves. An argument is undec if it is attacked by at least another undec. If it is attacked only by arguments out, it must be in, and if it is attacked some argument in, then it is out. The unique reinstatement labelling that corresponds to the system S {\displaystyle S} above is L = { ( a , i n ) , ( b , o u t ) , ( c , o u t ) , ( d , i n ) } {\displaystyle L=\{(a,{\mathit {in}}),(b,{\mathit {out}}),(c,{\mathit {out}}),(d,{\mathit {in}})\}} . === Inference from an argumentation system === In the general case when several extensions are computed for a given semantic σ {\displaystyle \sigma } , the agent that reasons from the system can use several mechanisms to infer information: Credulous inference: the agent accepts an argument if it belongs to at least one of the σ {\displaystyle \sigma } -extensions—in which case, the agent risks accepting some arguments that are not acceptable together ( a {\displaystyle a} attacks b {\displaystyle b} , and a {\displaystyle a} and b {\displaystyle b} each belongs to an extension) Skeptical inference: the agent accepts an argument only if it belongs to every σ {\displaystyle \sigma } -extension. In this case, the agent risks deducing too little information (if the intersection of the extensions is empty or has a very small cardinal). For these two methods to infer information, one can identify the set of accepted arguments, respectively C r σ ( S ) {\displaystyle Cr_{\sigma }(S)} the set of the arguments credulously accepted under the semantic σ {\displaystyle \sigma } , and S c σ ( S ) {\displaystyle Sc_{\sigma }(S)} the set of arguments accepted skeptically under the semantic σ {\displaystyle \sigma } (the σ {\displaystyle \sigma } can be missed if there is no possible ambiguity about the semantic). Of course, when there is only one extension (for instance, when the system is well-founded), this problem is very simple: the agent accepts arguments of the unique extension and rejects others. The same reasoning can be done with labellings that correspond to the chosen semantic : an argument can be accepted if it is in for each labelling and refused if it is out for each labelling, the others being in an undecided state (the status of the arguments can remind the